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What is The re  to. Explain? 
Since 1600, France has lived through several e r a s  of collective action. As the 
seventeenth century began, i t  was common fo r  t h e  people who formed a communi ty  
t o  assemble, t o  deliberate, t o  recite their grievances against their patron, t o  decide 
tha t  they would withhold t h e i r  s e rv i ces  f r o m  t h a t  pa t ron  unt i l  he  r igh ted  t h e i r  
wrongs. The patron could even be the king of France. Thus in seventeenthcentury 
France mutiny, rebellion, and routine local politics bore an uncanny r e semblance  t o  
e a c h  o ther .  I t  was t h e  a g e  of t a x  rebellions, of regional insurrections headed by 
grea t  lords, of resistance t o  marauding soldiers, and then -- at the  century's very end 
-- of newfangled f w d  riots. 
In those food riots of 1693 and thereafter,  local people sometimes blocked the 
shipment of grain from or through their communities, sometimes broke  i n t o  p r i v a t e  
s t o r e s  of g ra in  and  f o r c e d  them i n t o  publ ic  cont ro l ,  and sometimes coerced the 
marketers  of grain or  bread into selling their wares below the  going price. This form 
of action had some kinship with the invasion of enclosed fields, with mass poaching, 
with the  a t tack  on a landlord's dovecotes. As compared with the  mutinous assemblies 
of the  seventeenth century, they had an edge of anti-capitalism. Although they did 
not displace the  t ax  rebellion and the  resistance t o  marauding troops, they produced a 
new balance of collective action, one tha t  endured a century or more. 
In our own time, none of these forms of co l l ec t ive  ac t ion  occur  i n  France .  
B u t  F r e n c h  people do s t r i ke ,  petition, demonstrate, hold protest meetings, conduct 
electoral campaigns, and (now and then) organize revolutionary conspiracies. They act 
together,  but not in the  forms of the seventeenth century. The French have created 
a different repertoire of collective action, and use i t  routinely. 
Why and how did t h e  change  occur?  In t h e  largest terms, because in the 
nearly four hundred years s ince  1600, F r a n c e  has  become  a n  in tense ly  c a p i t a l i s t  
c o u n t r y  wi th  a powerful,  c e n t r a l i z e d  na t iona l  state. T h e  processes  of capital  
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concentra t ion  and s t a t emaki  ng, broadly defined, account for the transformations of 
collective action over the interval. The point  of th is  essay is not  t o  prove t h a t  
sweeping assert ion,  but  t o  ske tch  a way of examining it closely. It provides an 
outline of structural change in France since 1600, then limns a comparison of f i v e  
regions during the same period. This paper's preliminary portrayal of the five regions 
- Anjou, Burgundy, Flanders, the  Ile d e  France, and Languedoc - will not provide an 
explanation of change in the regions, or in France as a whole. But i t  will, I hope, 
provide a context and a prologue for detailed examinations of the contrasting regional 
experiences with structural change and collective action. 
The changes we have t o  explain, then,  a r e  a l t e ra t ions  in t h e  cha rac te r  of 
popular col lec t ive  action in France from 1600 t o  1980. At  the most general level, 
the  development of capitalism and the  growth of the national state produced those  
alterations. Let us begin with the national state. 
Taxes and Statemaking 
The  mountainous growth of the national s ta te  appears clearly in the long-run 
- rise of taxes. Figure One combines fragmentary evidence from old-regime budgets 
(drawn from Clamageran,  1867-1876) wi th  of f ic ia l  figures for the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries (from Annuaire S ta t i s t ique  1966). Using ~ o u r a s t i j s  ser ies  of 
e s t i m a t e d  wages of a semi-skilled provincial worker (a manoeuvre de province: 
~ o u r a s t i g  1969: 44-49), we can- express the  total tax burden as hours of work, then as  
hours of work per capita. These are  conservative measures; because real wages rose 
greatly in the  long run, they greatly understate the  increase in the  state's purchasing 
power. On t h e  other hand, by using personal work-time as a standard, they give a 
sense of the state's rising impact on the daily life of the average citizen. 
The statistic in question is gross receipts from regular taxes. It has a larger 
margin of error for the old regime than for recent decades. The old-regime sources 
a r e  f l imsier  and less reliable. Before 1750 or  so, a large share of state revenue 
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FIGURE .1: GROSS FRENCH T A ~  RECEIPTS EXPRESSED AS WORKER-HOURS OF WAGES, 1600-1960 
c a m e  f rom so-called "extraordinary" sources such as forced loans and the sale of 
I 
offices. A signif icant  port ion of t h e  t a x e s  col lec ted  never reached t h e  s t a t e  
t reasury ,  because  they went into the pockets of tax farmers, creditors, and sticky- 
fingered officials instead. Finally, the corn merc ia l iza t ion  of t h e  French economy 
made i t  easier to assess, to collect, and even t o  pay taxes; the disruption of social 
life caused by a given amount of taxation therefore surely declined as time .went on 
(see  Ardant  1975). As  a result  of all  t h e s e  factors ,  the earlier figures tend t o  
overestimate t h e  revenues d i rec t ly  avai lable  t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  government,  but t o  
underestimate the  weight of the exactions borne by the French public. Nevertheless, 1 
I 
the  two curves give a good sense of t h e  genera l  trend. I t  runs upward, a lmost  I 
continuously upward. 
The curves show us a breathtaking rise in the state's demands from the end of 
the sixteenth century t o  the  1640s, followed a by a slower growth up t o  the time of 
t h e  Seven Years1 War (1756-1763). The flattening of the curve after 1650 is a bit 
misleading; it covers the great age of expedients: making do by mortgaging f u t u r e  
income, repudiating debts, devaluating currency, forcing "gifts" and special payments, 
as well as creating and selling offices. (The selling of offices amount t o  long-term 
borrowing, s ince  t h e  of f ices  car r ied  sa la r i e s  and/or  fees, and often provided tax 
exemptions to  boot.) The flattening of the curve probably - does correspond, however, 
t o  s o m e  s h i f t  of t h e  expenses of the  s t a t e  toward t h e  merchants ,  off icials ,  
corporations, and property-owners who loaned the  money and bought the  offices. 
The evidence has a regrettable gap for  the  period of the Revolution. France 
emerged from the  Revolution with a tax burden at least as great as at t h e  end of 
t h e  Old Regime: From t h e  ear ly  n ine teen th  century,  t h e  growth of the state's 
demands was rapid, and nearly continuous: accelerating in times of war, slowing o r  
even  declining in  depressions, but  frequently matching the dizzy expansion of the 
early seventeenth century. In the early centuries, the  money that  ac tual ly  reached 
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P a r i s  or  Versa i l les  wen t  la rge ly  f o r  a rmed forces and the  expenses of the Court. 
During the  nineteenth and twentieth centuries, military expenditures and t h e  c e n t r a l  
bu reauc racy  cont inued  t o  absorb large shares of the state's revenue, but more and 
more went into expanding state services, education, welfare, and policing. 
The  per capita burden rose and rose: In 1600, our hypothetical average citizen 
worked some 50 hours for t he  state each year (the actual -worker  put in much more 
time, of course, since the  "per capital1 includes the  ent i re  population of children, old 
people, and so on). The figure stood at 150 hours of work in ' t he  1640s, about t h e  
same  in the 1760s, around 200 hours per year a century later, over 300 at the s t a r t  
of the twentieth century, nearing 700 worker-hours per  person per  yea r  in  r e c e n t  
times. So far, t he  curves show no slowing of the  state's incessant growth. 
Out  of t h e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  of t h e  r i s e  of t h e  na t iona l  state, t h e  g rowth  of  
cap i t a l i sm,  and  the  previously existing s t ructure of France came  a further series of 
changes: the  proletarianization, industrialization, urbanization, population growth ,  a n d  
s h i f t s  i n  communica t ion  which so altered the  texture of l i fe  in  the nineteenth and 
t w e n t i e t h  centuries. People often lump these changes together  as "modernization". 
The  word is misleading, both because it usually depends implicitly on the notion of an  
earlier, slow-changing, integrated, " t radi t ional"  s o c i e t y  and  because  i t  sugges ts  a 
standard process undergone by one traditional society afer  another. Certainly neither 
idea f i t s  t h e  French experience; no mat te r  how far  back w e  g o  in  t ime ,  we  neve r  
e n c o u n t e r  t h j  at hypothetical static, integrated, traditional social world. Nor do we 
find France recapitulating t h e  expe r i ence  of England,  t h e  Nether lands ,  o r  o t h e r  
s u p p o s e d  e a r l y  m o d e r n i z e r s .  A s  a n  e x p l a n a t i o n  of F r e n c h  soc ia l  change,  
" m ~ d e r n i z a t i o n ~ ~  is a useless idea. 
The value of the notion of modernization, if any, is not as an answer, but as a 
question: why - have  p ro l e t a r i an i za t ion ,  urbaniza t ion ,  indus t r ia l iza t ion ,  populat ion 
growth ,  communica t ions  sh i f t s ,  and  so many o t h e r  changes  occurred together so 
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f r equen t ly  over  t h e  l a s t  f e w  centur ies?  In t he  case of France, there a r e  strong 
connections be tween  t h o s e  changes  and t h e  m a s t e r  p roces ses  of cap i t a l i sm and  
statemaking.. 
More exac t ly ,  t h e  development  of capitalism and the growth of the natiqnal 
state interacted with each other and with the  previously existing social structure t o  
produce  a g r e a t  s e r i e s  of f u r t h e r  t r ans fo rma t ions  of France :  indus t r ia l iza t ion ,  
urbanization, bureaucratization, population growth, proletarianization, concentration of 
cap ta l ,  t h e  increas ing  involvement  of ordinary individuals in national politics, and 
many alterations in the quality of everyday experience. 
Seventeenth-century  France was already a capitalist country in many regards, 
and already had a relatively strong state. It  was a l so  a n  indus t r i a l  power wi th  a . 
l a r g e  populat ion and i m p o r t a n t  c i t i e s  -- no t  only Dijon and Paris, but also great 
international centers such as Lyon, Toulouse, and Marseille. Yet  in  all these respects 
and  more  t h e  changes of t he  seventeenth to  twentieth centuries far  surpassed those 
of the  previous four hundred years. The F r a n c e  t h a t  e m e r g e d  was  a n  e s sen t i a l l y  
u rban  coun t ry  desp i t e  i t s  s en t imen ta l  a t tachment  to the countryside; a country in 
which most people worked for wages in large o rgan iza t ions  d e s p i t e  a c e r t a i n  bias  
toward the independent artisan or shopkeeper; a nation in which the  state bureaucracy 
found i t s  way into every corner  of da i ly  l i f e  d e s p i t e  a widespread  belief i n  t h e  I 
independence of the  ordinary French person. The role of capitalism in all this change 
was  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  p roduc t ive  resources  and  decis ions in  a f e w  hands and t o  
t r a n s f o r m  most  workers  i n t o  p ro l e t a r i ans  employed by those few decision-makers. 
The role of the state was t o  facili tate tha t  concentration and t o  c r e a t e  a para l le l  
concentration of political power. 
What was France? 
At  the close of the sixteenth e n t u r y ,  the ideas of llFrance" and "the French" 
were sharp at the  center, but blurred indeed at the  edges. A well-bounded F r e n c h  
/ 
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world, ne t ly  d i s t i n c t  f r o m  the worlds of Spain, Italy, or Switzerland, only emerged 
from the  heroic statemaking of the  following centuries. Speakers of Breton occupied 
a l a r g e  wes t e rn  a r m  of t h e  t e r r i t o r y  c l a imed  by t h e  French crown, speakers of 
various langues doc the  southern half of t he  land. The Pope ruled a large enclave 
around Avignon. The entire eastern frontier consisted of duchies and principalities of 
uncertain loyalty. About one f i f th  of what would become t h e  continental France of 
the  twentieth century -- including Artois, Flanders, Alsace, Lorraine, ~ r a n c h e - ~ o m t e ' ,  
t h e  French Alps, and 'much of Provence - lay under the control of t h e  Habsburgs or  
t he  Dukes of Savoy. Burgundy, which now sits comfortably distant from the borders 
of Germany and Switzerland, was then a troubled f r o n t i e r  province,  vu lnerable  t o  
invasion, insurrection, and smuggling. . 
In t h e  in t e r io r ,  t h e  subordinat ion of g r e a t  lo rds  t o  the French crown was 
grudging and intermittent,  punctuated by conspiracies, rebellions, and foreign alliances. 
Protestant magnates who feared the Catholic crown and treasured their own autonomy 
maintained effect ive control of major c i t i e s  a n d  s u b s t a n t i a l  reg ions  in  Guyenne, 
Languedoc,  Sa in tonge ,  and Poitou. The Edict of Nantes (1598) had confirmed the  
claims t o  survival of tha t  series of Protestant states within t h e  Catholic state. As 
of 1600, F r a n c e  was less  a cen t r a l i zed  monarchy  t h a n  a n  uneasy confederation 
coordinated from Paris. 
Y e t  a l l  is re la t ive .  In that world of Elizabeth I, Philip 11, and Henri IV, of 
Shakespeare, Cervantes, and Theophile d e  Viau, t h e  French kingdom was exceptionally 
unified, i t s  t e r r i t o r y  unusually continuous, its crown surprisingly powerful. What is 
more, i n  i ts  seventeenth-century context, France was r i ch  and  populous. Some  18  
million people  i nhab i t ed  i t s  450,000 s q u a r e  k i lometers ,  as compared with the 11 
million of the sprawling Russian empire, t h e  8 million of Spain, t h e  4.5 million of 
England, t h e  s ingle  mil l ion of t h e  Nether lands .  Via the great fairs of Lyon the 
woolens and Linens of France journeyed around t h e  Mediterranean. Wines of Bordeaux 
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g r a c e d  t h e  mea l s  of prosperous  Flemings,  whi le  salt from the Bay of Bourgneuf 
s t reamed t o  t h e  Baltic. Marseille, Bordeaux, L a  Rochelle, Nantes, and Rouen s tood  
among the most important European ports. Inside the  kingdom, the bustling markets 
of Paris and Lyon drew upon the  agriculture and manufacturing of broad hinterlands. 
France was starting to  overcome the commercial advantage of Spain, and appeared to  
be holding off the mercantile challenges of England and Holland 
A century later,  in 1700, much had changed. Relative to  England and Holland, 
if not t o  Spain, the  economic and political importance of France had receded. While 
England was experiencing population growth on t he  order of a third, and thus nearing 
6 million inhabitants, France was only edging  up a b o u t  a twen t i e th ,  t o  19  o r  20  
million. I t  began t o  look as if Louis XIV -- just past the  War of the League of 
Augsburg, and soon t o  undertake the War of t h e  Spanish Success ion  -- would k e e p  
France  in a s ta te  of perpetual combat. Pa r t s  of t he  coutnry had suffered acute  food 
shortages in t h e  1690s, and would face  them again in t he  next decade. The century 
as a whole had been a t ime of massive popular rebellions, including the  Fronde. The 
prosperous, powerful France of 1600 had certainly not evolved i n t o  a s t ab l e ,  placid 
state. 
Y e t  aga in  a l l  is re la t ive .  By comparison with the  s t a r t  of the seventeenth 
century, French manufacturing had multiplied. Nantes and other Atlantic ports were 
shipping French textiles widely through Africa and the Americas. French ar t is ts  such 
as ~ o l i & r e  and Couperin set standards for all of Europe.  T h e  dr ive  of Richel ieu,  
Mazarin,  Co lbe r t ,  and Louis XIV had built up an army and a s t a t e  apparatus which 
were much stronger, and several times larger, than they had been in 1600 That army 
a n d  t h a t  state had conquered  and inco rpora t ed  ~ranche-comtg , .  Alsace, Lorraine, 
Artois, and some of Flanders; on the  eastern frontier, substantial numbers of people 
speak ing  German ic  languages now lived under French control. The beginning of the 
eighteenth century was a t ime of vigorous economic and political expansion. 
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In sheer territorial terms, the French expansion was nearing i t s  peak a century 
later, in 1800. By tha t  year Napoleon's conquests had pushed the  boundaries of the  
F rench  Republic t o  the Rhine and into Savoy, and brought much of Italy under the 
power of France. Within a few years af ter  1800 France and its satellites governed 
all Italy, a l l  Spain, I l lyria  and, beyond the Rhine, Holland and Westphalia as well. 
Although the  Revolution of the  previous ten years had shaken and t ransformed t h a t  
expanding French government,  for  its t i m e  it was a marvel of centralization and 
e x t r a c t i v e  power. T h e  French economy had likewise f e l t  t h e  w e i g h t  of t h e  
Revolution, with the increasing demand for military goods not compensating the loss 
of markets for export industries. 
Nevertheless,  t h e  e ighteenth  century  as a whole brought great expansion t o  
I 
French agr icul ture  and industry: a l ikely r i se  of 25-40 percent  in agr icul tura l  
production (Le Roy Ladur ie  1975: 395), a plausible annual growth ra te  of 1.5-1.9 
percent in the  industrial sec tor  (Labrousse et al. 1970: 521). The population of 
France (excluding the new territories seized by i t s  revolutionary armies) had risen t o  
27 million. That figure still towered over t h e  1 0  or  11 million of Spain and t h e  
combined 16 million of England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. However, the German 
empire-in-the-making visible in and around the  Prussian territories contained some 20 
million people, a disciplined military forae, and important industrial nuclei. As a 
commercial and industrial power, France had lost ground t o  England. As a large ,  
cen t ra l i zed  nat ional  s t a t e ,  F rance  found others ,  including Bri tain and Prussia, 
threatening her preeminence. 
In anothir century,  by 1900, a g r e a t  simplification of the European map had 
occurred. Just nine states -- Spain, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, Sweden, 
Norway, Grea t  Britain, and France -- occupied the great bulk ofthe European land 
mass and population. The  French state, f o r  i t s  par t ,  had ballooned: during t h e  
nineteenth e n t u r y ,  in real terms, the national budget had quadrupled, while France's 
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economy was growing a b i t  l ess  rapidly t h a n  that; the  effect,  according to  Jean 
Marczewski, was t o  raise t he  ratio of the  state budget t o  t he  gross physical product 
slightly: from 13.7 percent (1803-18 12) t o  14.7 percent (1905-19 13) (Marczewski 1965: 
Ixx). France had lost its demographic superiority: t o  i t s  39 million people, Germany 
now had 56 million, Britain and Ireland 42 million, Italy 34 million. A t  that  point, 
France had given up Alsace-Lorraine t o  Germany, but had gained a chunk of ,Savoy 
plus the regions around Avignon and Nice. During the century, France had likewise 
acquired vast areas of northern and western Africa, as t h e  European powers  divided 
up the continent. 
Al though a g r i c u l t u r e  still played an important part  in French national life at 
the  s t a r t  of the  twentieth century, France had become a recognizably urban-industrial 
country. In 1800, some 15 percent of the French population had lived in urban places 
(by which French census-takers meant communes with 2,000 or  more people in their 
chief  agglomerat ion);  by 1900, that figure had become 41 percent. In labor force 
terms, agriculture, forestry, and fishing had declined f rom a b o u t  5 5  p e r c e n t  of a l l  
employmen t  i n  1800 t o  abou t  40  p e r c e n t  in  1900; t h e  labor  f o r c e  shif t  is less 
dramatic than the  population shift because an important part  of France 's  nineteenth- 
century urbanization consisted of a transfer of industry and services from countryside 
t o  city; the  result was t o  leave the  countryside more purely agricultural in  1900 than 
., 
it had been for centuries before. 
A t  our  te rminus ,  i n  t h e  1980s, t h e  European map of 1900 was still visible. 
The Austro-Hungarian Empire, it is true, had cracked into a series of states, most of 
t h e m  beholden t o  Russia's successor state, the  Soviet Union. In the  Balkans, areas  
such as Bulgaria and South Serbia had shaken loose from t h e  Ottoman Empire, spent 
some t ime in or under the  shadow of Austria-Hungary, and eventually reformed into 
new states. A separate  Poland had appeared in what had previously been  w e s t e r n  
Russ ia  and e a s t e r n  Germany, while Germany itself had split - or, rather had been 
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sp l i t  -- i n to  two hostile states. An independent Ireland and an independent Finland 
had come t o  life. France itself had recovered Alsace-Lorraine from Germany. Yet 
the alterations of the  European map from 1900 t o  1980 were much less dramatic than 
had been those of the  nineteenth century. 
Within t h e  F rench  boundaries, change continued. A population whose total 
numbers only inc reased  slowly (from 39 million i n  1900 t o  52  million in 1976, 
including the effect of regaining ~lsace-Lorraine)  nevertheless redistributed radically. 
The French moved out from the interior, especially toward the north and east, piling 
up in cities as never before: 16 million people in urban places in 1901, 21.5 million in 
1946, 28.5 million in 1962, 37 million in 1975. During the  first  three quarters of the  
t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y ,  r ea l  per cap i t a  income rose, according t o  Alfred Sauvy's 
measurements, from 58 francs in 1901 t o  78 in 1946, 167 in 1962, and 315 in 1974. 
Whereas up t o  the  beginning of t h e  century  agriculture, forestry, and fishing had 
merely declined relatively as a result of changing little while manufacturing and 
se rv ices  increased much, as the  twen t i e th  century moved on agriculture declined 
absolutely; a lit t le under 9 million workers in 1901, still around 9 million in  1921, 
about 7.5 million in 1946, just under 4 million in 1962, fewer than 2 million in 1975. 
Equally important, but harder t o  i l lus t r a t e  with simple s ta t i s t ics ,  was t h e  
knitting together of the country by roads, trains, airplanes, and mass communications 
- all systems centering on Paris to  such an extent that  it is often difficult t o  pass 
from one secondary point to another without going through the capital. The rhetoric 
of decentralization becomes an indispensble tool of administrations that  nevertheless 
c o n t i n u e  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  t h e i r  a c t i v i t y  a t  t h e  c e n t e r .  What  people cal l  
decentralization is actually an increasing division of labor: surveillance and decision- 
making t h e  growing specialities of Paris and i ts  region, production, extraction, and 
amusement the expanding functions of other cities and other regions of France. 
Five Cities, Five Regions 
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In o r d e r  t o  g e t  s o m e  sense  how t h e s e  processes  worked, and  how they  
transformed ordinary people's collective action, we  must descend f r o m  t h e  na t iona l  
heights. A comparison of five cities and their regions will help. Here is the roster: 
Dijon and Burgundy, Paris and i t s  Ile d e  France, then  Angers with Anjou, Lille with 
Flanders (and sometimes pieces of Hainaut, ~ a m b r 6 s i s ,  and Artois as well), Toulouse 
with t h e  Toulousain (and sometimes the  whole of Languedoc). 
In 1652, P e t e r  Heylyn published a book demurely ti t led Cosmographie in Four 
Bookes. Containing t h e  Chorographie and Hiftorie of the  Whole World, And a l l  t h e  
pr inc ipa l  Kingdomes, Provinces, Seas, and Ifles Thereof. The section ti t led 'FRANCE, 
Properly f o  called," runs: 
T h e  f i r f t  p lace  which the Franks o r  French has for their fixt habitation, was 
by tha t  people honoured with the name of FRANCE; t h e  f i r f t  g r e e n  tur f  of 
Gal l ick  ground, by which t h e y  took  l i v e r y  a n d  f e i f i n  of a l l  t h e  reft. A 
P rov ince  now bounded on t h e  E a f t  w i t h  Champagne ,  on  t h e  N o r t h  w i t h  
Normandie, on the  Weft and South with L a  Beauffe. T o  difference i t  from the 
main Continent of France, it is called t h e  I f l e  of F r a n c e ;  a s  being c i r c l ed  
a l m o f t  round wi th  severall Rivers, t h a t  is t o  fay the  Oife  -on the North, the  
Eure on t h e  Weft, t h e  Velle on t h e  E a f t ,  and  a v e i n i R i v e r e t  of t h e  Se ine  -
toward the  South. A Countrie not f o  la rge  as many of the French Provinces, 
but fuch as hath given name unto  a l l  t h e  r e f t ,  it being t h e  f a t e  of many 
fma l l ,  b u t  puiffant Provinces, t o  give their name to  others which a re  greater 
than they, if conquered and brought under by them . . . A Countrey generally 
f o  fruitfull and delectable (except in Gaftinois) t ha t  the  very hills thereof a r e  
equally t o  t he  vallies in moft places of Europe; but t h e  V a l e  of Monmorencie 
(wherein - Paris ftandeth) fcarce  to be fellowed in the ~ o r [ l ] d .  An Argument 
wereof may  be, t h a t  when t h e  D u k e s  o f  B e r r y ,  B u r g u n d i e ,  a n d  t h e i r  
C o n f e d e r a t e s ,  bef ieged  t h a t  Ci ty  with an  Armie of 100000 men; neither the 
Affailants without, nor the  Citizens within, found any fcarci t ie  of victuals; and 
y e t  t h e  C i t i zens ,  bef ides  Souldiers, were reckoned at 700000 (Heylyn 1652a: 
154). 
Thus  t h e  Fronde ,  just  ending, provided Heylyn with evidence of both the centrality 
and the  richness of t h e  Ile d e  France. 
When he c a m e  to : - the  Dukedom of Anjou, r a t h e r  en larged  in his account, 
Heylyn remarked t h a t  
T h e  C o u n t r e y  f o r  t h e  m o f t  p a r t  is v e r y  fruitful and pleafant, efpecially in 
Tourein; as is the  whole tract upon t h e  Loir. Anjou is fomewha t  t h e  m o r e  -
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hilly, but otherwife little inferiour t o  Tourein, affording plenty .of white wines, 
the  beft  in  France: and yielding from thofe  Hills a b o v e  40  R ive re t s ,  f a l l i ng  
into the Loire -from thence . . . (Heylyn 1652a: 167). 
Languedoc was different: 
T h e  C o u n t r i e  on t h o f e  p a r t s  which l i e  next t o  Auvergne, is like the hi her 
parts thereof, mountainous and not very fruitfull; in all the  r e f t ,  a s  r i c   
pleafant as the  beft  provinces in France and having the advantages of Olives, 
Raifins, Figs, Orenges, and  o t h e r  f r u i t s  no t  ord inary  but  here ,  and  in  t h e  
neighboring P rovesce .  In tha t  participating the  commodities both of France 
and Spain. The people have fomewhat i n  t h e m  of t h e  a n c i e n t  Gothes,  and  
draw neerer to the temper of the  Spaniards, than any other of the French, as 
being accounted very devout, g rea t  vaunters of themfelves, a f f e c t i n g v e r y  
above their condition and eftates;  not carring how they pinch i t  on the working 
days, or at home in private,' f o  they may flaunt i t  in the  f t ree t ,  and be f ine 
o n  hol d a  s. T h e  humour alfo of the-women,  and in them more pardonable 
(Hey*a: 183). 
Pe ter  Heylyn found Burgundy rather less appealing: . 
A Province f o  well watred with pleafant and p r o f i t a b l e  Rivers ,  t h a t  as Qu. 
Catherine de Medices ufed t o  fay of France, That i t  had more fair  rivers than 
all  Euro e; f o  we may f ay  of this  Countrie, That i t  hath m o r e  f i n e  R i v e r e t s  --P t h a n  a1 F rance ;  h e r e  being t h e  R i v e r s  of 1 Armacan, 2 Serum, 3 Curi 4 
Terney. 5 Valence, 6 Dove, - 7 Brune, 8 - Sein, 9 Louche,  a n d  1 0  ~oasne*he 
Araxis  of t h e  ant ient  w r i t e r s m s  l a f t  dividing the two Burgundies from one 
another. Ye t ,  no twi th f t and ing  t h i s  g r e a t  p l en t i e  of waters ,  t h e  Coun t ry  
generally is lefs fruitfull than the  rest  of France: hardly yeelding fufficient for 
its own inhabitants, except wines onely (Heylyn 1652a: 193). 
As f o r  F landers ,  Heylyn r e se rved  t h a t  description for his second volume, and the 
section on Belgium; in  1652, Flanders was not  French, but Spanish, territory: 
T h e  Soyle  i nd i f f e ren t ly  f r u i t f u l l  i n  co rn  and paf tures ;  t h e  aire  healthfull, 
temperate and pleasant. The whole Countrey not in  l eng th  above  90. .mi les ,  
and  in  b read th  but  s ixty;  a n d  y e t  containing in that compaffe above thirty 
Cit ies  (for they reckon all Cities which be walled) 1154 Villages; which f t a n d  
f o  th ick  (as  needs they muft in ' f o  narrow a compaffe) that the Spaniards at 
their f i r f t  coming in with King Philip t h e  fecond, took the whole Province for  
one Town (Heylyn 1652b: 7). 
F i v e  regions, then,  quite different in character: a capital and its hinterland, an  old 
agricultural district, a vast and culturally distinctive southern province, a r e l a t ive ly  
poor f r o n t i e r  area blessed with a rich vineyard, a thickly-settled commercial region 
just beyond the  border. These are the  five sections whose experience with contention 
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we are exploring and, in the measure possible, attempting to  explain. 
The selection of five regions from the  fifteen or twen ty  t h a t  easi ly sugges t  
them selves is necessari ly arb i t rary .  Dare  we neglect Lyon, Marseille, Bordeaux, 
Nantges, Le  Havre, or even Limoges? Can we l e t  those  f ive  provinces speak f o r  
Alsace, Provence ,  Corsica,  Berry, Bri t tany? No: There is no way t o  choose five 
areas that  sum up all of France, especially when we have four centuries t o  survey. 
Y e t  t h e  a t t e m p t  t o  fol low t h e  ebb and f low of contention throughout the entire 
country over nearly four centuries would be even more futile than the  search for a 
sc ien t i f i c  microcosm. The  point of scrutinizing five cities and their regions is to  
keep the analysis manageable, yet to  assure some differences among t h e  points of 
observation. If common patterns emerge, we gain confidence that  they hold for the 
country as a whole. If persistent d i f ferences  appear,  we  acquire  a sense  of t h e  
factors that underlie those differences. 
Dijon and Burgundy. For most purposes our "Burgundytt is a shrunken relic of 
its historic self, the  territory of the present-day department of Cote cPOr. Now and 
then we s t r a y  i n t o  t h e  ad jacen t  department of Saone-et-Loire, which includes the 
lower portion of the  Burgundy incorporated by France in the  f i f teenth  century,  and 
which extends  almost to  Lyon. The region remained a national frontier until Louis 
XIV made his conquests to  the  east; for a long time, like other military frontiers, it 
remained under t h e  pa t ronage of g r e a t  princes, whose loyalty to  the crown was 
always contingent on the  benefits they received. Wine dominated Burgundy's long-' 
d is tance  t rade ,  and f ine  wine capped t h e  products  of an  essentially agricultural 
region. In addition t o  Dijon, Chatillon-sur-Seine, Semur-en;Auxois, Beaune, and other 
. . 
Burgundian cities all figured importantly in the  region's collective action. 
Paris and the  Ile d e  France. The "island" of France consists of the territory 
blocked out  by the  rivers Eure, Yonne, Marne, Aisne, and Epte, cut  through by the 
greatest river of them all, t h e  Seine. Beauvais, Compi igne ,  Fontainebleau,  and 
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C h a r t r e s  mark  its o u t e r  l imits ,  i t s  a r e a s  of compet i t ion  with Maine, Normandy, 
Picardy, Champagne, and the  Orleanais. Since the  1960s the administration of the  Ile 
d e  F r a n c e  has fallen into seven separate departments: V a l  dOise (capital: Pontoise), 
Yvelines (capital: Versailles), Essonne (capital: Evry), V a l  de  Marne (capital: Crgteil), 
Hauts-de-Seine (capital: Nanterre), Seine-St. Denis (capital: Bobigny), and Paris itself. 
Today's SeinGet Marne (Melun), plus significant chunks of Oise ( ~ e a u v a i s )  and Aisne 
( ~ a o n )  also belonged to  the old-regime province. 
From a commercial and political viewpoint, Par is  has dominated this  e n t i r e  
region s ince  t h e  l a t e r  Middle Ages. Until recently, however, the  area outside the 
great walled capital divided into three qu i t e  d i f f e ren t  s o r t s  of places: e s t a t e s  of 
g r e a t  magnates  (ecclesiastical, noble, and bourgeois alike); zones of intensive cash- 
crop farming, sometimes overlapping with the  estates; towns and small c i t ies  having 
t h e i r  own commercial  rationales. For the century before the Revolution, Versailles 
partly displaced Paris as the  effective capital of France. In the  twentieth century, 
desp i t e  repeated  a t t e m p t s  a t  comprehensive planning, and despite the survival of 
gorgeous forests, parks, and castles, the  entire region has coalesced increasingly into 
a single built-up metropolis centered somewhere between the Eiffel Tower and the 
Hotel de Ville. 
Angers and Anjou. Angers, t h e s e  days, is a city of 100,000 straddling the 
Maine River, a few kilometers north of the  Loire, with a metropolitan area reaching 
down t o  t h e  Loire. When the  Constituent Assembly of 1790 blocked out France's 
departments, it 'did a fairly good job of approximating the  old duchy of Anjou wi th  
t h e  new depar tment  of Mainee l -Lo i re ,  and of sepa ra t ing  i t  f rom the adjacent 
territories of Brittany, Poitou, Touraine, and Maine. Thus fo r  most  purposes t h e  
contemporary  l imi t s  of Maine-et-Loire will s e r v e  as  our Anjou Under the Old 
Regime, Angers stood only in the third echelon of French political structure: i t  had 
no Parlement or Estates, and was administratively subordinate to  an Intendant based 
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in Tours. Saumur, ~eaufor t -e%~al lCe,  E3aug6, sear& and other small cities play parts 
in the  history of Angevin contention, although by comparison with Burgundy or the  Ile 
de  France Anjouls experience of the last three centuries is rather rural. 
For a major part of that  period, the province's fate depended especially on the  
fortunes of the Loire. The river carried Angevin wheat elsewhere in France, and the 
wines of its valleys "i- Saumur, Layon, Muscadet, Cabernet, rose' dAnjou-L- i n t o  t h e  
export market. As the slave trade of Nantes flourished in the eighteenth century, a 
vast, export-oriented textile industry grew up in rural areas both north and south of 
t h e  Loire. As a resul t  of the nineteenthcentury decline of slaving and the acute 
competition of cotton fabrics with the  linens of Anjou, tha t  Angevin textile industry 
contracted, and concentrated in a few small cities such as Cholet. 
Lille and Flanders present quite a different picture. Only wrested definitively 
f r o m  t h e  Habsburgs in the seventeenth century, on the Belgian frontier to  this day, 
partly Flemish-speaking and strongly tied by culture, trade, and population movements 
to port ions of t h e  Low Countries that  remained outside of France, the region was 
conquered foreign territory t o  a much l a rge r  degree  than  any portion of Anjou, 




our practical definition of Lille's region, does not approximate any previously-existing I 
unit ,  soc ia l  or political,  very accura te ly .  I t  corresponds roughly to  the northern 
territories France acquired from the  Habsburgs in the  1678 Treaty of Nimwegen, by 
which Franche-Comte also became French. The name "Flanders" is an inaccurate 
shorthand: af ter  centuries of struggle and transfers between France and its neighbors 
a m a j o r  p a r t  of t h e  F l e m i s h  t e r r i t o r y  remained outs ide  of F rench  control;  
furthermore, the  Nord not only touches Picardy, but contains sections of the  historic 
provinces of Cambresis, Artois, and Hainaut as well. 
None of this means t h e  region of Lil le  was insignificant.  I t  was one of 
France's earliest and most important manufacturing regions. Lille was a great textile 
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c i ty ,  and  its countryside hummed with small-scale spinning and weaving, long before 
t h e  Revolution. During t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  cen tu ry ,  c o a l  mining brought  dus t  a n d  
prosperity t o  such centers as Anzin, as cotton spinning brought smoke and prosperity 
t o  such centers as Roubaix. The industrial triangle of Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing began 
t o  coa l e sce  and  t o  grow i n  t h a t  s a m e  century .  Cambrai, Dunkirk, Valenciennes, 
Armentieres and other cities also participated in t he  expansion of manufacturing and 
commerce. Yet agriculture survived, and even prospered, in the  Nord: among French 
departments, says Michel Morineau, only t h e  Nord and  t h e  a d j a c e n t  Pas-de-Calais  
"stand up t o  comparison with England, Belgium, and the  Netherlands,. the pioneers of 
European agriculture" (Morineau 197 1: 301.' 
Toulouse and L a n ~ u e d o c  To go from Lille t o  Toulouse takes us almost from 
t h e  English channel to  the  Mediterranean, i n t o  a d i f f e r e n t  world. T h e  Coun t s  of 
Toulouse  c a m e  under t h e  con t ro l  of t h e  F r e n c h  crown long before 1600, ye t  the  
region maintained a distinctly Mediterranean language and culture long af te r  then. A 
c o m m e r c i a l  and  pol i t ica l  c a p i t a l  back  t o  Roman  t imes ,  Toulouse  r e t a ined  its 
exceptionally autonomous municipal institutions, t h e  Capitolat, against t h e  c l a ims  of 
lo rds ,  bishops, judges, and  kings. Nevertheless, the  Generality (and therefore t he  
~ntendant )  of Languedoc was not q u a r t e r e d  i n  Toulouse, bu t  i n  Montpel l ier .  T h e  
modern-day department of HauteXaronne,  on which we will focus here, approximates 
t h e  Toulousain, heart  of old Languedoc. Languedoc as a whole is large; t he  province 
extends from the Mediterranean to  fill an  a rea  west of the Rhone and northeast of 
t h e  Pyrenees; Roussillon, Gascony, Perigord, Auvergne, t h e  Lyonnais,  Dauphine', a n d  
P r o v e n c e  a r e  all i t s  neighbors. The Toulousain itself iS Mediterranean and Roman: 
set t led in  large towns, raising olives and grapes in addition t o  i ts  wheat. 
Comparisons to  Come 
D i j o n ,  A n g e r s  a n d  T o u l o u s e  r e s e m b l e  e a c h  o t h e r  as commerc ia l  and  
administrative headquarters fo r  large rural regions. They  a l so  d i f f e r  i n  i m p o r t a n t  
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ways8 because  t h e i r  reg ions  differ in  culture and geopolitical significance; because 
Angers lost i t s  political autonomy and in f luence  t o  t h e  F r e n c h  c rown  very  ear ly ,  
while in  different ways Toulouse and Dijon held onto important levers of power up t o  
t h e  Revolution; because the  fine wines of Burgundy, t h e  t e x t i l e s  of  Anjou and  t h e  
polycultures of the  Toulousain, not to  mention other economic differences among the  
regions, pulled their capitals in different directions. Paris and Lille have in  common 
their major industrial concentrations, but differ dramatically in  many other respects. 
If t he  histories of contention in these diverse regions display common characteristics, 
w e  will have  s o m e  a s su rance  t h a t  t h e y  r e su l t  from processes tha t  operated very 
genera l ly  i n  France .  If t h e y  d i f f e r  s ign i f icant ly ,  w e  wi l l  have  s o m e  hope  of 
identifying the bases of their differences. 
Of course there a r e  some common trends. In all these regions, w e  witness the 
rise of t he  s ta te  and the  expansion of capitalism. We also see t h e  i m p a c t  of t h e  
two great changes on the  contention of ordinary people. In all of them, we observe 
a seventeenth and an eighteenth century in which the  state is r each ing  inces san t ly  
into local affairs and resources, in which the  contention of ordinary people often aims 
at fending off the  insatiable demand of royal officials for  men, for  money, for  food, 
f o r  services .  Dur ing  t h e  n ine t een th  and t w e n t i e t h  cen tu r i e s ,  t h e  fending  off 
continued, but an increasing share of the  action consis ted of demanding  some th ing  
from the  state; t h a t  new trend correlated with a nationalization of political power, a -
centralization of decisiohmaking. 
In all the  regions, we also notice the  growing prevalence of capitalist property 
relations: the destruction of common use rights, t he  shift toward production for  sale, 
t h e  s e t t i n g  of p r i ce s  f o r  a l l  f a c t o r s  of product ion,  inc luding  land,  the growing 
dominance of wage-labor, t he  increasing power of t he  owners of capital as compared 
with those who own land or labor or technical expertise. These trends continued into 
the nineteenth century, when a new trend joined them: an increasing concentration of 
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capital,. and a corresponding rise in the  scale of producing units. Not all these trends 
were unilinear: by the  middle of the  ni'neteenth century, for  example, there were few 
common use rights l e f t  to  destroy, and the government was moving slowly toward the 
creation of new common facilities such as schools and hospi tals ;  again,  t h e  f a m i l y  
f a r m  r e g a i n e d  a m e a s u r e  of i m p o r t a n c e  as wage  l abo re r s  began t o  f l e e  t h e  
countryside toward 1900. 
I t  is also possible  tha t  since World War 11, with the  nationalization of a few 
industries and the  increasing deliberate involvement of t he  state in economic policy, 
the  power of capitalists with respect to  government officials has declined. Possible, 
but not selfavident ;  the  sticky question is how much government officials continue t o  
s e r v e  c a p i t a l i s t  i n t e r e s t s .  In any  case, t h e  d r i f t  of our period a a whole runs 
powerfully toward capitalism, m o r e  capi ta l i sm.  On t h e  whole,  w e  f ind ord inary  
people resisting tha t  drift, but ineffectually, -- at tempting t o  hold off the increasing 
power of the  capitalists among them, attempting t o  hold on t o  their prior collective 
rights to  land, labor, crops, and goods, resisting proletarianization, fighting the growth 
of disciplined large-scale production. Now and  t h e n  w e  f ind  t h e m  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  
def lect  the  process, for  example in the sporadic nineteenth-century visions of small- 
scale  socialism. The grea t  revolutionary moments involve a t empora ry  synthes is  of 
t he  resistance t o  the present with an alternative vision of the  future. In 1789, for 
example, we  discover a coalescence of resistance t o  t he  rising exactions of the  state 
with a vision of a world in which property is t he  only basis of privilege. 
In all the  regions, finally, the  bases on which people ac ted  together, when they 
did act col lec t ive ly ,  a l t e r e d  grea t ly .  In ve ry  gene ra l  t e r m s ,  t h e y  moved from 
community t o  association. When ou r  s even teen t tGcen tu ry  Angevins,  Toulousains,  
Burgundians, F lemings ,  and  Parisians got together, i t  was generally as members of 
groups tha t  included a large round of life: villages, gilds, age-grades,  and  t h e  like. 
Those  communi t i e s  f r equen t ly  had a recognized collective identity and distinctive 
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privileges, but they usually encompassed a broader range of shared' interests and less 
often resulted from a d e l i b e r a t e  dec is ion  t o  o rgan ize  t h a n  is t h e  case wi th  t h e  
collective action of our own time. With the  nineteenth century we observe a great 
increase in t he  deliberate creation and use of spec id- in te res t  organizat ions:  f i rms ,  
unions, clubs, pa r t i e s ,  and  t h e  like. Communities did not disappear, but they lost 
their dominance as the  bases of collective action. In t he  process, t he  sheer scale on 
which people organized  and  ac ted  tended t o  increase. On the average, i t  became 
more common for  thousands of people from dozens of localities t o  take  part  in t h e  
same action: a strike, a demonstration, a boycott, an  electoral campaign. Specialized 
associations and larg&-scale collective action rose together. 
S p e c i a l i z e d  a s s o c i a t i o n s  t h a t  o r g a n i z e d  a c t i o n  f r equen t ly  drew t h e i r  
memberships from a single social class, and represented t h e  in te res t s  of t h a t  class.  
Although unions and parties provide the  salient examples, clubs, citizens' associations, 
and even recreational groups often worked t h e  same way. Why not, then ,  speak  of 
t h e  e m e r g e n c e  of a soc i e ty  of classes? After  all, many observers have read the  
nineteenth century tha t  way. 
T h e  r eason  f o r  r e j e c t i n g  t h a t  label is simple: social classes also existed and 
ac t ed  in  earlier centuries. . They did not, however ,  bea r  t h e  names  cap i t a l i s t  a n d  
worker .  They  ca l l ed  e a c h  o the r  landlord,  r en t i e r ,  peasan t ,  agricultural laborer, 
artisan, and so on. In a world in which relationships t o  land made the  profound sor t  ' 
of difference tha t  relationship t o  capital makes in our own world, people who bore a 
common relationships t o  a given chunk of land were likely t o  build a whole round of 
l i f e  a round t h a t  common relat ionship;  classes w e r e  l ike ly  t o  form communities. 
Common relationship t o  the  same land tended t o  mean not only common work, b u t  
a l so  com mon res idence ,  common means of subsistence, common privileges, common 
access t o  serv ices ,  common rel igious i d e n t i t y ,  common m a r r i a g e  pool, common 
subjection t o  political authority. Interlaced, those common ties formed communities. 
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B e c a u s e  of t h e  f lu id i ty  and  s p a t i a l  d i scont inui ty  of cap i t a l ,  a common 
relationship t o  a given block of capital  does not generate communities as regularly as 
common relationship t o  a given block of land does. To be sure, that is a matter  of 
degree:  t h e  c a p i t a l  f i xed  in  a s ing le  l a r g e  f a c t o r y  p romotes  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  
homogeneous  communities of owners, managers, and workers, unified by shared work 
and shared residence. But on the  average capital  generates fewer communities than 
land. When people  having a common relationship t o  capital organize, they almost 
necessarily do so on a larger scale than do people who already belong t o  class-based 
communi t ies .  They  f requent ly  do so  through the  deliberate creation of specialized 
associations. The rise of capital as t h e  g r e a t  divider  means  t h e  p ro l i f e r a t ion  of  
a s soc i a t ions  and t h e  i n c r e a s e  of c o l l e c t i v e  act ion 's  scale. Changing patterns of 
contention in  Anjou, Burgundy, Flanders, Languedoc, and t h e  Ile d e  France showed t h e  
net  shift from community t o  association, from small scale to  large, qui te  dearly.  
Not only the  scale, but also the  character  of collective action changed. Some 
f e a t u r e s  of t h e  change  should already be clear. For one thing, t he  relationship of 
c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion  t o  daily,  weekly, o r  annual  rout ines  a l t e r e d .  B a c k  i n  t h e  
seventeenth century, a large share of all collective action went on in  the  context of 
routine, authorized public gatherings such as marke t s ,  f a i r s ,  processions,  f e s t i va l s ,  
hangings, and loca l  electoral assemblies. As the  twentieth century approached, t he  
relative impor t ance  of rout ine ,  au tho r i zed  publ ic  ga ther ings  decl ined.  Ins tead ,  
de l ibera te ly-ca l led  meet ings ,  ra l l ies ,  s t r i kes ,  demonst ra t ions ,  and other prepared 
actions became common means of getting together t o  act on shared interests. They 
broke with everyday routine. As a result, they gave the average individual a sharper 
choice between joining or not joining a collective action than his seventeentf;century 
ancestors faced. The organizer of a meeting or a demonstration can't count on the  
\ 
membership's being there as a mat te r  of course. 
If you  l o o k  o n l y  a t  t h e  n ine teenth ;  a n d  twen t i e th -cen tu ry  end of t h e  
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con t inuum,  t h e  change  i s  e a s y  t o  misconstrue.  F r o m  t h e  point  of view of a 
contemporary organizer ,  it looks  as though ord inary  people  used t o  be  passive,  
unmobilized, uninvolved in politics ---as though it took the  strenuous organizing of 
t he  last century t o  mobilize t h e  masses. What actually happened was quite different: 
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  of power t ended  t o  - demobi l ize  ord inary  people and to  make their 
ordinary routines i r re levant  a n d  i n e f f e c t i v e  as means  of c o l l e c t i v e  act ion.  T h e  
na t iona l iza t ion  of politics t ha t  eventually grew from the centralization of power did 
c r ea t e  new opportunities fo r  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  bui l t  around e l ec t ions  and  s imi la r  
i n s t i t u t i o n s .  I t  c r e a t e d  t h e  "problem" of mobil izat ion,  a n d  an unprecedented  
opportunity -for  professional organizers t o  work at solving tha t  problem. T h e  soc ia l  
movement - the sustained, organized challenge t o  the existing s t ructure or exercise 
of power in the  name of some large interest';- took shape. The whole repertoire of 
collective action changed. 
As the repertoire of collective action detached itself f rom local daily routines, 
some of its quality as folklore disappeared. The r i t ua l  mockery ,  t h e  e f f ig ies ,  t h e  
f i f e s  and drums, the songs, the garish symbols faded from the  forms of contention. 
The mat te r  is not easy t o  s o r t  out :  p a r t  of t h e  reason  t h a t  a Lan tu re lu  o r  t h e  
parading  of a dummy on a gallows now looks like folklore is tha t  twentieth-century 
observers. see an antique sheen on almost any fea ture  of seventeenth- or eighteenth- 
c e n t u r y  l i fe .  T h e  l anguage  is quain t ,  t h e  c lo th ing  i s  museumlike, t h e  names of 
people, shops, a n d  t r a d e s  a r e  unfamil iar .  A twenty-second;century s t u d e n t  of 
American demonstrations in the  1960s will undoubtedly be impressed wtih the folklore 
of Yippies and  F lower  Children.' Y e t  by v i r t u e  of i t s  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  a n d  i t s  
d e t a c h m e n t  f r o m  everyday routine, the  contemporary repertoire carries over less of 
the  ritual and symbolism shared by particular local populations than did nowiforgotten 
f o r m s  of con ten t ion  such as food riots and charivaris. In t ha t  sense, at least, the 
history of French contention shows us a decline of folklore. 
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T h e  s a m e  change has another  side. Many of t h e  older fo rms  of ac t ion  
consisted of a crowds carrying out -- somet imes  in parody, somet imes  in deadly 
ea rnes t  -- a rout ine  t h a t  normally belonged to  the authorities. Hanging in effigy, 
seizing stored grain and selling it below the  c u r r e n t  m a r k e t  price,  decapi ta t ing  a 
traitor and displaying his head, refusing the permit the collection of a tax until the 
collector produced full documentation of his r ight  t o  co l l ec t  i t  were  al l  s tandard  
governmenta l  routines; t h e y  also became  s igni f icant  f e a t u r e s  of "seditionsn and 
"emotionsN. That borrowing of the  place and the  action of t h e  au thor i t i e s  did not  
disappear in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but it became less common and 
less salient. In a sense, the autonomy of the  crowd and of t h e  ac t ion  increased.  
The power of the  crowd and the efficacy of the action did not necessarily grow as a 
consequence; patronage and the  borrowing of established routines w e r e  o f t en  very 
effect ive ways of pursuing common interests. The crucial change was the creation of 
autonomous, specialized forms and organizations for collective action. 
In genera l  te rms,  t h e  forms and in tens i t i e s  of collective action vary as a 
function of three broad factors: interests, organization, and opportunity.  All t h r e e  
a l t e r e d  signif icantly f rom t h e  seventeenth t o  the twentieth century. W e  can see 
already that the  rise of the  national s tate  and the  expansion of capital ism grea t ly  
altered what sets of people had pressing common interests in collective action s well 
as the  character of the  interests they shared. The corpora te  t r a d e  and t h e  self- 
sustained religious community, for  example, virtually disappeared as the political 
coalition or the specialized occupational group became prominent interests. There is  
no doubt t h a t  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  organization of such interests has changed. The 
most obvious change has been the  rise of various forms of special-purpose association. 
Along with that  change has come the increasing imporance of professional organizers, 
running from committed revolutionaries to  sleek fund-raisers. 
The opportunities for collective action, too, have shifted dramatically. So far, 
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t h e  a spec t  of t h a t  shift we have seen .most clearly has been the nationalization of 
power and politics. Increasingly the action (or, f o r  t h a t  m a t t e r ,  t h e  inact ion) of 
large organizations and of national s tates  has created the threats and opportunities to 
which any interested a c t o r  has t o  respond. Increasingly, nat ional  politics have  
provided the  channels within which an actor ' can deal effectively with the interest in 
question. Increasingly, the  repression or facilitation applied to a particular actor by 
organizations of national scope -- and, especially, by the national state itself - has 
determined whether the actor could act  effectively at all. 
For the moment, i t  would be idle to  weigh the relative importance of changes 
in interests, organization, and opportunity. I t  would be  p remature  t o  specify t h e  
ways they influenced each other.  It is enough. for now to realize that they were 
profound changes, that  they occurred together and interdependently,  and t h a t  t h e y  
comprise much of what people have in mind when they talk about the modernization 
of politics or about political development. 
In one  perspective,  these  changes sum in to  the creation of a bureaucratic, 
capitalist, specialized world dominated by power governments, large organizations, and 
big cities.  In another  perspective, they  amount  t o  fundamental  changes in the 
interests, organization, and opportunit ies  t h a t  toge the r  govern t h e  intensi ty and 
c h a r a c t e r  of col lec t ive  action. In yet  a third perspective, they mean a profound 
alteration in the repertoires of contention employed by ordinary p.eople. The t h r e e  
perspectives converge. 
A comparison of five regions will serve to document and to specify the grand 
trends. It  will help us understand how they work, and how they interact. There are, 
for example, strong correlations among the  concentration of power in the state, the 
nat ionalizat ion of politics,  t h e  en la rgement  of t h e  e l e c t o r a t e ,  t h e  r ise of t h e  
association as the chief vehicle of political action, and the increasing employment of 
the meeting and the demonstration as means of col lect ive action. Why, how, and 
FIVE FRENCH REGIONS: 23 
with what regularity did those axrelat ions occur? That is not so clear; a close look 
at the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries will clarify the connections. 
Consider another problem. W e  have all too many plausible explanations of the 
food riot's rise and fall: the changing cost of food, t h e  changing policies of local  
officials, the changing beliefs and organization of poor people, the changing practices 
of merchants ,  and others. All of t h e m  p r o b a b l y  p l a y e d  t h e i r  p a r t s  i n  t h e  
seventeenth-century rise and the nineteenth-century fall of the food riot; but in what 
proportions, and in what connection with each other? Observation of food supply and 
of conflicts over food in the five regions should make the proportions and connections 
easier t o  grasp. 
Comparisons will also ident i fy  s igni f icant  differences. W e  will notice, for 
instance, a contrast between the more or less artisanal producers of fine Burgundies, 
who produced plenty of republican ac t iv i s t s  during the  n ineteenth  century  but 
remained aloof f rom large  winegrowers' movements  in t h e  twent ie th ,  and t h e  
increasingly proletarian winegrowers of Languedoc, who at one time supplied many 
recruits to anarcho-syndicalism, and later mounted large str ikes and demonst ra t ions  
aimed simultaneously a t  large distributors and at the state. W e  will see associations 
becoming prominent bases of contention in Paris and the  Ile de  France earlier than in 
the other four regions, and will have occasion t o  wonder why. Thus the diff~rences,  
as well as the similarities, will lead us t o  f u r t h e r  ref lec t ion  on t h e  relat ionships 
among capitalism, statemaking, and changing forms of contention. 
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NOTE. T h e  H o r a c e  R a c k h a m  School  of G r a d u a t e  S tud ie s  and  t h e  Division of 
Research and  Deve lopmen t  Adminis t ra t ion ,  Univers i ty  of Michigan, suppor t  t h e  
r e s e a r c h  program descr ibed  in  t h i s  paper.  I a m  grateful to  Dawn Hendricks for 
assistance with bibliography. 
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